Household Access to Microcredit and Children's Food Security in Rural Malawi: A Gender Perspective by Hazarika, Gautam & Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb
IZA DP No. 3793
Household Access to Microcredit and Children’s Food



























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
October 2008 
Household Access to Microcredit and 
Children’s Food Security in Rural Malawi: 




University of Texas at Brownsville 















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 











Household Access to Microcredit and Children’s 
Food Security in Rural Malawi: A Gender Perspective 
 
Using data from the 1995 Malawi Financial Markets and Food Security Survey, this study 
seeks to discover if women’s relative control over household resources or intra-household 
bargaining power in rural Malawi, gauged by their access to microcredit, plays a role in 
children’s food security, measured by anthropometric nutritional Z-scores. Access to 
microcredit is assessed in a novel way as self-reported credit limits at microcredit 
organizations. Since credit limits, that is, the maximum sums that might be borrowed, hinge 
upon supply-side factors such as the availability of credit programs and the financial 
resources of lenders, it is plausible they are more exogenous than demand driven loan 
uptake or participation in microcredit organizations, the common ways of gauging access to 
microcredit. It is indicated that whereas the access to microcredit of adult female household 
members improves 0–6 year old girls’, though not boys’, long-term nutrition as measured by 
height-for-age, the access to microcredit of male members has no such salutary effect on 
either girls’ or boys’ nutritional status. This may be interpreted as evidence of a positive 
relation between women’s relative control over household resources and young girls’ food 
security. That women’s access to microcredit improves young girls’ long-term nutrition may 
be explained in part by the subsidiary finding that it raises household expenditure on food. 
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1.  Introduction 
There are, broadly, two competing models of intra-household allocation: the Unitary Model and the 
Collective Model. The Unitary Model, attributed to Becker (1965, 1981), assumes that household resources 
are distributed among its members according to a single set of household preferences, that is, the household 
is a monolithic unit.  The Collective Model, on the other hand, commonly views intra-household distribution 
as the outcome of Nash Bargaining between members with dissimilar preferences, so that allocations to a 
member (and her constituency) are dependent on her bargaining power.  Since it plausible mothers are more 
solicitous of children than fathers, that is, their preferences are more weighted toward beneficent children’s 
outcomes, greater women’s bargaining power or control over household resources may yield children tangible 
advantages if intra-household distribution proceeded according to the Collective Model.  Indeed, this 
implication of the Collective Model has been the common means of testing between these competing models 
of the household. There is now a fair body of empirical evidence that intra-household allocation is the 
outcome of bargaining between household members.  For example, Thomas (1990) finds that child survival 
probabilities in Brazil are much more improved by increases in mothers’ than fathers’ unearned income, 
mothers’ unearned  income being taken to measure their relative control over household resources.  
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) find that an increase in the share of household income earned by women in 
Cote d’Ivoire raises the proportion of the household budget expended on food and reduces the budget shares 
of alcohol and cigarettes. Handa (1996) uncovers evidence from Jamaica that the presence in a household of a 
female decision-maker generally increases the share of the household budget allocated to child and family 
goods.  Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997), in an examination of a late 1970s policy change in the U.K. that 
transferred a substantial child allowance to wives, find that this resulted in greater expenditures on women’s 
and children’s clothing relative to men’s clothing.  Levin, Ruel, and Morris (1999), in a study of urban 
households in Ghana, find that women allocate a larger share of their income towards meeting their children’s 
and their own basic needs despite earning less than men. Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (2002) learn 
that child health in Java is influenced by the relative asset positions of parents at the time of their marriage, 
pre-marital assets being taken to measure intra-household bargaining power.  This paper attempts to emulate the few studies that measure women’s intra-household bargaining power by their access to microcredit.  In 
the parlance of the Collective Model, a woman’s intra-household bargaining power is positively related to her 
reservation or threshold utility, that is, to the breadth of her options outside marriage.  It is plausible that 
women’s access to microcredit, that is, financing for microenterprises or small businesses, broadens these 
options by boosting women’s earning potential.  For example, Pitt and Khandker (1998), in an examination 
of microcredit programs in rural Bangladesh, determine that household consumption expenditure increased 
by 18 taka for every 100 taka borrowed by women, as opposed to an increase of only 11 taka for every 100 
taka borrowed by men.  Further, Pitt, Khandker, Choudhury, and Millimet (2003) find that whereas women’s 
access to microcredit in rural Bangladesh significantly improves children’s health outcomes, men’s access to 
credit has no such statistically discernible effect.  This study too attempts to link women’s intra-household 
bargaining power as measured by their access to microcredit, to children’s health outcomes, specifically, their 
nutritional status. The finding, for instance, that children’s nutritional status, a measure of their food security, 
is better improved by women’s access than by men’s access to microcredit shall suggest intra-household 
allocation proceeds according to the Collective Model rather than the Unitary Model. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses empirical concerns pertaining 
to the measurement of access to microcredit, and describes the utilized data and empirical methodology. 
Sections 3 and 4 present the study’s empirical findings and conclusions, respectively. 
 2. Empirical Concerns, Data, and Empirical Methodology 
Access to credit, in studies relating it to economic outcomes, has usually been measured in two ways: 
dichotomous membership in credit programs, and actual loan uptake.  Both these measures may be 
unsuitable for estimating the true causal effect of access to credit (David and Meyer, 1980). First, since credit 
program participation and loan uptake are voluntary, the measures are potentially endogenous.  For example, 
parents who avail of loans may have better nourished children, but it cannot be concluded that loans advance 
child nutrition since parents more heedful of their children’s health may be likelier to seek out helpful loans.  
Second, loan uptake would measure access to credit accurately only if credit limits were universally binding, 
that is, if everyone’s loan uptake were equivalent to her credit limit.  In reality, individuals often don’t fully 
exercise their option to borrow.  Even so, that option may well influence their economic behavior. For 
example, households with unexercised option to borrow might, as a result, feel sufficiently secure to expend 
more of their current resources upon children’s nutrition. Third, membership in a credit program often 
confers benefits unrelated to credit access such as literacy classes. These secondary effects of credit program 
participation may bias estimates of the true causal effect of access to credit. Finally, mere membership in a 
credit program may not guarantee ready access to credit since many group-based credit programs stipulate 
that only a portion of a group’s members may receive credit at any time.  Hence, Diagne (1998) and Diagne 
and Zeller (2001) argue that the credit limit, that is, the maximum amount that may be borrowed, is a better 
measure of credit access. The authors reason that unlike credit program participation or loan uptake, which 
are related to demand for credit, the credit limit, reflecting mainly supply-side factors such as the availability 
of credit programs and the financial resources of lenders, is a truer measure of an exogenous credit constraint.   
Data for this study are drawn from the Malawi Financial Markets and Food Security Survey 
conducted jointly in 1995 by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Department of 
Rural Development (DRD) of the Bunda College of Agriculture of the University of Malawi.  A total of 404 
rural households in 45 villages of 5 Malawian districts were surveyed. The yearlong survey consisted of three 
rounds.  The first round was conducted from February to April, the second between July and September, and 
the third in November and December.  The surveyed households did not constitute a random sample. Since it was necessary to include sufficient numbers of microcredit program participants in the survey, stratified 
random sampling was employed to ensure that half of the final sample of 404 households consisted of 
current microcredit program participants with past participants and non-participants making up 
approximately equal portions of the remainder.  The non-randomness of the sample calls for the inclusion of 
sampling weights in estimation.  
The Survey is unusual in having queried respondents over 17 years of age about the maximum 
amount they might conceivably borrow at any one time.  Thus, access to credit may be measured as self-
assessed credit limits.  This study measures female household members’ access to microcredit as the sum of 
their credit limits at microcredit organizations, and, similarly, male members’ access to such credit as the sum 
of their credit limits.  Since 75 per cent of the households surveyed had adult members who were either 
current microcredit program participants or past participants, that is, who were familiar with microcredit 
organizations and their lending rules, it is likely the reported sums are credible.   
Oddly, however, available credit reported at Round 1 often far exceeds the sums reported at Rounds 
2 and 3.  For example, in 35 per cent of households, the combined credit available to adult female members is 
larger at Round 1 than at Round 2. Indeed, in full 27 per cent of households, this sum is positive at Round 1 
but zero at Round 2.  Perhaps this is because reported available credit at Round 1 pertains to the previous 
three years, whereas the sums elicited at Rounds 2 and 3 relate merely to the few months between the rounds. 
Recall that the first round of the Survey was conducted from February to April of 1995, the second between 
July and September, and the third in November and December.  If there were natural ebbs and flows in 
opportunities to borrow, it is likely the maximum sums that might be borrowed at any one time shall be larger 
within the time span of three years than within three months. Further, it is plausible the reported sums are 
credit limits less current borrowing. Hence, an individual who has drawn upon a portion of her credit limit 
between Rounds 1 and 2 of the Survey may report having access to a smaller sum of credit at Round 2 than at 
Round 1. It would be wrong to interpret this as reduction in her bargaining power since the act of borrowing 
to finance a microenterprise is in fact a demonstration of her bargaining power.  In other words, whereas 
bargaining power may be best measured by credit limits, reported available credit may underestimate credit limits.  Note, in this context, that three years is a period long enough to accommodate an entire loan cycle, 
and so the maximum credit available to a respondent at any one time in the previous three years may well 
equal her credit limit.  On the other hand, it is likelier there shall be outstanding loans throughout the few 
months between the rounds, that is, the periods may be briefer than a loan cycle, and so it is plausible the 
maximum credit available to a survey participant at any one time during these months is less than her credit 
limit.  Thus, whereas a survey participant’s credit limit at Round 1 is taken to be the reported maximum 
amount she might have borrowed at any one time in the preceding three years, her effective credit limit at 
Round 2 is taken to be the greater of the sums reported at Rounds 1 and 2, and her effective credit limit at 
Round 3 is considered to be the largest of the sums reported at Rounds 1, 2, and 3.  
The Malawi Financial Markets and Food Security Survey gathered the heights and weights of 0 to 6 
year old children. The former are converted into height-for-age anthropometric nutritional Z-scores, a 
measure of ‘stunting’ or long-term nutrition, and weight-for-height Z-scores, a measure of ‘wasting’ or short-
term nutrition, by the methodology prescribed by the World Health Organization (WHO, 1983).  These Z-
scores constitute the principal dependent variables of the study’s regression analysis, the regressors of primary 
interest being the combined credit limits at microcredit organizations of, separately, adult female household 
members and adult male members.  
Assuming adult microcredit limits have dissimilar effects upon girls and boys, the regression 
equations may be specified as 
(1)   hazi = α1. creditfemalei × girli + α2. creditfemalei × boyi  
+ α3. creditmalei × girli + α4. creditmalei × boyi  
+ Xi’ α5 + e1i,
and 
(2)   whzi = β1. creditfemalei × girli + β2. creditfemalei × boyi  
+ β3. creditmalei × girli + β4. creditmalei × boyi  
+ Xi’ β5 + e2i, where hazi and whzi denote, respectively, child i’s height for-age and weight-for-height anthropometric Z-
scores, girli  and boyi  indicate child i’s gender, creditmalei is the combined credit limit of her household’s adult 
male members, creditfemalei is the combined credit limit of her household’s adult female members, Xi  is a 
vector of other plausible correlates of children’s anthropometric nutritional status, and e1i and e2i, the error 
terms, signify unobserved random influences.  The finding that creditfemale has a more pronounced positive 
effect upon children’s anthropometric nutritional Z-scores than creditmale will suggest children’s food security 
in rural Malawi is improved by gains in women’s bargaining power as predicted by the Collective Model of 
intra-household allocation.  
The study pursues the complementary strategy of comparing the effects of creditmale and creditfemale 
upon household expenditure patterns.  The finding, for instance, that creditfemale has a greater positive effect 
upon household expenditures on food than creditmale will suggest children’s food security is improved by 
gains in women’s relative control over household resources.  However, since food is not consumed by 
children alone, the study also compares the effects of creditmale and creditfemale upon household expenditures 
on goods plausibly consumed only by adults, such as tobacco, adult clothing and footwear, and items of 
adults’ personal grooming like cosmetics.  Ceteris paribus, decreases in household expenditures upon goods 
consumed exclusively by adults ought to improve children’s food security. The finding that an increase in 
creditfemale causes a more pronounced reduction in household expenditures upon such ‘adult goods’ than an 
increase in creditmale  will suggest children’s food security is improved by gains in women’s bargaining power. 
The pertinent regression equations are of the form 
(3)   expgoodkj =λ1k.creditmalej + λ2k.creditfemalej + Zj’ λ3k +ukj , 
where expgoodkj denotes household  j’s expenditures upon the good k, Zj signifies other plausible correlates of 
the household’s expenditures upon the good, and ukj represents unobserved random influences. The 
particular goods considered are food and the plausible adult goods of tobacco, goods and services for adults’ 
personal grooming such as cosmetics, and adult clothing and footwear. 
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated upon a sample of 820 zero to six year old children pooled from 
all three rounds of the Survey. This sample of children shall be referred to as the ‘Child Anthropometrics Sample’. On the other hand, equations of the form (3) are estimated upon a pooled sample of 541 households 
to which these children belong. This sample of households shall be referred to as the ‘Household 
Expenditures Sample’. 
 
3. Empirical Findings 
Table 1 presents the (unweighted) sample mean values of all the variables employed in equations (1) and (2).  
The mean height-for-age Z-score of these 820 children is -2.33.  Since a Z-score between -2 and -3 indicates 
moderate malnutrition, it seems there is widespread long-term malnutrition among 0 – 6 year old children in 
rural Malawi. 45.7 per cent of these children are female. The children’s average age is about 3 years and 4 
months.  The average child is one of some 7 household members, of whom approximately 2 are in the age 
group 0 – 6 years.  It is likely parental literacy is an important determinant of childhood nutrition and health, 
but since, as argued by Basu and Foster (1998), individual literacy may confer positive externalities within a 
household, children may also benefit from the literacy of household members other than their parents.  
Hence, literacy is measured by the proportion of 12 or older household members literate in the Chichewa 
language.  The average child is from a household in which about 28 per cent of 12 or older members are 
literate.  20.1 per cent of these children reside in female-headed households.  It is likely children’s nutrition 
depends upon household income and wealth.  However, since it is plausible intra-household allocations of 
consumption and allocations of leisure (the converse of work for adult members) are simultaneous, income 
from work, or earned income, may be an endogenous regressor in equations (1) and (2).  Thus, only 
household unearned income consisting of gifts and remittances is included as an explanatory variable.  
Table 2 presents the (unweighted) sample mean values of the variables employed in equation (3).  
Average household expenditure on food during the past three days is about 31.8 MK.  Average spending on 
tobacco during the previous four weeks is about 2.3 MK. Average household spending on items of adults’ 
grooming is about 9.7 MK and that on adult clothing and footwear is approximately 57.4 MK. The average 
combined credit limit of adult female household members is about 482 MK whereas the average access to 
microcredit of adult male household members is approximately 587 MK.  Table 3 presents weighted OLS estimates of the coefficients of (1) and (2), the weights being 
household sampling weights adjusted for the pooling of data from the three survey rounds.  For example, if a 
particular child is observed in all three rounds and so is thrice included in the pooled Child Anthropometrics 
Sample, the sampling weight she is associated with is taken to be her household’s sampling weight divided by 
3. Children’s height-for-age Z-scores, measuring their long-term nutrition, are significantly higher in female-
headed households.  This is consistent with Handa’s (1996) finding that the presence in a Jamaican household 
of a female decision-maker generally increases the share of the household budget allocated to child and family 
goods.  It is noteworthy that whereas the access to microcredit of adult female household members 
significantly improves girls’, though not boys’, long-term nutrition, the access to microcredit of adult male 
members has no such beneficial effect on either girls’ or boys’ nutritional status. That a plausible rise in 
women’s intra-household bargaining power improves the nutrition of a section of children may be considered 
evidence of intra-household allocation proceeding according to the Collective Model rather than the Unitary 
Model.  The additional finding that children in female-headed households enjoy superior long-term nutrition 
bolsters this conclusion.  
In contrast, there is no evidence that children’s short-term nutrition as measured by their weight-for-
height Z-scores is correlated with women’s access to microcredit.   
Table 4 presents estimates of the coefficients of (3).  Expenditure on food significantly increases in 
household size, but, controlling for the total number of household members, decreases in the numbers of 
resident 0 – 6 year old children, presumably because young children require less food.  Wealthier households 
spend more upon food, as do female-headed households, whereas the opposite seems true of households 
headed by older individuals. It is noteworthy that household expenditure on food significantly increases in 
women’s access to microcredit.  It is plausible this contributes to the positive relation between women’s 
access to microcredit and young girls’ long-term nutrition reported in table 3.  Note, though, that women’s 
access to microcredit does not appear to influence household expenditures upon the adult goods of tobacco, 
items of adults’ personal grooming, or adult clothing and footwear. 
 4. Conclusion 
This study seeks to discover if women’s relative control over household resources in rural Malawi, gauged by 
their access to microcredit, influences children’s food security, measured by anthropometric nutritional Z-
scores.  The finding that women’s access to microcredit improves children’s nutrition shall suggest intra-
household allocation proceeds according to the Collective Model rather than the Unitary Model.   
Access to microcredit is measured in a novel way as self-reported credit limits at microcredit 
organizations.  Since credit limits, that is, the maximum sums that might be borrowed, hinge upon supply-side 
factors such as the availability of credit programs and the financial resources of lenders, it is plausible they are 
more exogenous than demand driven loan uptake or participation in microcredit organizations, the common 
ways of gauging access to microcredit. 
It is found that whereas young girls’, though not boys’, long-term nutrition and the access to 
microcredit of adult female household members are positively correlated, male members’ access to 
microcredit has no beneficial effect upon either girls’ or boys’ nutritional status. This suggests there is a 
positive relation between women’s relative control over household resources and 0 – 6 year old female 
children’s food security. That women’s intra-household bargaining power, as measured by their access to 
microcredit, improves the long-term nutrition of a section of children suggests that intra-household allocation 
in rural Malawi proceeds according to the Collective Model.  The uncovered positive relation between 
women’s access to microcredit and young girls’ long-term nutrition may be explained in part by the finding 
that the former raises household expenditure on food. 
TABLE 1 
Sample Means: Child Anthropometrics Sample 
n = 820 
 
Variable Sample  Mean  S.D. 
Dependent Variables    
Height-for-age Z-score (haz) – measures stunting  -2.331  2.435 
Weight-for-height Z-score (whz) – measures wasting  0.770  3.238 
Child Attributes    
Child is female  0.457  0.498 
Child’s age in months  39.560  19.271 
Household Attributes    
Number of members  6.754  2.433 
Number of 0 – 6 year old members  2.082  0.941 
Number of 7 – 11 year old members  1.088  0.867 
Proportion of literate 12 and older members  0.281  0.299 
Household head’s age in years  41.839  12.827 
Household head is female  0.201  0.401 
Total household unearned income, in hundreds of Malawi Kwacha (MK), in past 
15  months 
0.417 0.995 
Household wealth, in thousands of MK (land, other assets besides livestock, and 
food stocks)  
6.837 22.719 
Key Variables    
Access to microcredit, in hundreds of MK, of adult female household members 
× Child is Female 
2.241 6.072 
Access to microcredit, in hundreds of MK, of adult female household members 
× Child is Male 
2.383 6.013 
Access to microcredit, in hundreds of MK, of adult male household members × 
Child is Female 
2.365 12.137 
Access to microcredit, in hundreds of MK, of adult male household members × 
Child is Male 
3.950 18.061 
 TABLE 2 
Sample Means: Household Expenditure Sample 
n = 541 
 
Variable Sample  Mean  S.D. 
Dependent Variables    
Expenditure on food in past 3 days  31.788  29.337 
Expenditure on tobacco in past 4 weeks  2.271  14.939 
Expenditure on items of adults’ personal grooming since Oct. 1994 or last round of 
Survey 
9.672 23.961 
Expenditures on adult clothing and footwear since Oct. 1994 or last round of Survey   57.416  169.302 
Household Attributes    
Number of members  6.433  2.319 
Number of 0 – 6 year old members  1.804  0.868 
Number of 7 – 11 year old members  1.057  0.860 
Proportion of literate 12 and older members  0.285  0.308 
Household head’s age in years  41.919  12.621 
Household head is female  0.229  0.421 
Total household unearned income, in hundreds of Malawi Kwacha (MK), in past 15 
months 
0.430 1.053 
Household wealth, in thousands of MK (land, other assets besides livestock, and food 
stocks)  
7.443 27.122 
Key Variables    
Access to microcredit, in hundreds of MK, of adult female household members  4.819  8.363 
Access to microcredit, in hundreds of MK, of adult male household members   5.872  20.998 
 TABLE 3 
Determinants of 0-5 Year Old Children’s Anthropometric Nutritional Status 
Weighted OLS Estimates 
Sample: Child Anthropometrics Sample, n = 820 
Dependent Variables: height-for-age (haz) and weight-for-height (whz) Z-scores 
 

















































Key Variables    
Access to microcredit of adult female household 





Access to microcredit of adult female household 





Access to microcredit of adult male household 





Access to microcredit of adult male household 





R2 0.093 0.027 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. TABLE 4 
Determinants of Household Expenditures on Select Goods and Services 
Weighted OLS Estimates 
Sample: Household Expenditures Sample, n = 541 
Dependent Variables: expenditures on food (foodexp), tobacco (tobexp),  
items of adults’ personal grooming (groomexp), and adult clothing and footwear (clothexp) 
 
































































































R2 0.331 0.205  0.204 0.064 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. References 
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